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ARGUMENT 
A. Utah courts repeatedly have rejected immunity arguments 
similar to the District's argument in this case. 
This court has stated more than once that the "licensing exception" (UCA 
Section 63G-7-301(5)(c)) and the "inspection exception" (UCA Section 63G-7-
301(5)(d)) were intended to apply to regulatory, not operational, conduct. Gillman 
v. Department of Financial Institutions, 782 P.2d 506, 512-13 (Utah 1989), applied 
the licensing exception to an action arising out of the Department of Financial 
Institutions' approval of a bank's license application, reasoning that "[licensing 
decisions are essential governmental functions that must be free from tort 
liability." In Ericksen v. Salt Lake City Corp., 858 P.2d 995 (Utah 1993), this 
court, in refusing to apply the inspection exception to a government employee's 
negligent inspection of government-owned property, remarked that its ruling was 
consistent with the Gillman court's rationale that licensing exception immunity is 
based on the protection of regulatory conduct that benefits the public. Id. at 998. 
Other cases since have relied on the Gillman rationale, ruling that the inspection 
exception does not apply to operational conduct, but is meant to apply to 
regulatory decisions for which governmental discretion is essential. See, e.g., 
Nixon v. Salt Lake City Corp., 898 P.2d 265, 270-71 (Utah 1995) (Gillman relied 
on policy to protect those essential government functions necessary to protect 
public health and safety) (emphasis in original); cf Nelson v. Salt Lake City Corp., 
5 
919 P.2d 568, 575-76 (Utah 1996) {Gillman "involved a similar type of 
discretionary function where the state'failed to suspend or revoke" a bank's 
license). 
Contrary to such precedent, the District argues in its opening brief that the 
term "approval" in the licensing exception should protect all decisions and actions 
of all government employees ratifying, approving, or allowing any conduct, 
regardless of context, and regardless of the character of the decision or activity. 
The basis for this argument is that the licensing exception itself allegedly does not 
contain any limitation to its scope. The District, however, ignores the duty of this 
court to read the statute as a whole, giving effect to each part. See, e.g., Archuleta 
v. St. Mark's Hospital, 238 P.3d 1044, 1046 (Utah 2010). Furthermore, nearly 
identical arguments made by government entities in relation to the "inspection 
exception" and the "discretionary function exception" have been rejected not only 
in Ericksen and Nixon, but in many other cases. 
The inspection exception itself retains immunity for any inspection or 
failure to inspect, without limitation. See U.C.A. § 63G-7-301(5)(d). Applying 
the District's logic, a government entity's failure to properly inspect its own 
property or facilities must be immune from suit because the language of the 
inspection exception is not limited in any way. But the courts of this state have 
6 
disagreed with such logic on many occasions, relying on the regulatory function 
policy applied to the licensing exception in Gillman. 
For instance, in Johnson v. Department of Transportation, 98 P.3d 773 
(Utah Ct. App. 2004), the plaintiff sued UDOT for negligent inspection of a 
construction zone on a public highway. UDOT argued for application of the 
inspection exception, inasmuch as the plaintiff was arguing that UDOT had failed 
to properly inspect or monitor the contractor's safety precautions in the 
construction zone. M a t 781. The court of appeals rejected the argument, 
reasoning that "UDOT was not engaged in a regulatory activity." Id. at 782. The 
court stated that previous decisions had distinguished between inspections of 
private property versus inspections of the government's own property. Id. To rule 
otherwise would essentially nullify the waiver of immunity for dangerous or 
defective public improvements in Section 63G-7-301(3). 
The Johnson court relied on Ericksen. Ericksen found no immunity for a 
city worker who negligently caused injury while inspecting a door on public 
property. Id. at 998. The Ericksen court stated that its distinction between 
regulatory and operational activity with regard to the inspection exception had 
been applied to the licensing exception in Gillman. 858 P.2d at 998. Ericksen 
concluded that, regarding non-regulatory inspections of government property, 
"there is no policy reason to immunize the governmental entity any more than 
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when any other governmental employee acts negligently in the course of his 
employment." Id. 
Similarly, the court of appeals in Ilott v. University of Utah, 12 P.3d 1011 
(Utah Ct. App. 2000), found no immunity in a suit against the university for 
negligent inspection of its own bleachers. Relying on Ericksen, the court ruled that 
the inspection exception was intended to grant immunity where "the government 
inspects a third party's property for code compliance." Id. at 1013. The inspection 
exception itself contains no such limitation. But the meaning is clear when read in 
context with the rest of the statute. 
The same analysis has been applied to the discretionary function exception. 
Like the inspection exception, the discretionary function exception, in isolation, 
contains no limitation in scope. See UCA § 63G 6-7-301(5)(a). A casual 
definition of the term "discretion" is to "make an individual choice or judgment." 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, www.Merriam-Webster.com/dictionarv/ 
discretion. If such a broad interpretation of the word "discretionary" were utilized 
(as the District argues should be done in interpreting the exceptions to immunity), 
then the discretionary function exception would apply anytime any governmental 
actor exercises any discretion to make any choice in performing any activity. But 
our courts repeatedly have ruled that the term was intended to apply to core 
governmental policy making decisions, not to the exercise of discretion in 
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ministerial activities. See, e.g., Nelson, 919 P.2d at 575-76 (Utah 1996). The 
express words of the discretionary function exception are not so limited, but that 
does not mean that the exception is ambiguous because, when the immunity statute 
is read as a whole, giving effect to the waivers of immunity, the meaning intended 
by the legislature is clear. Our courts repeatedly have recognized that if the term 
"discretionary" were applied in a broad, casual sense, virtually all waivers of 
immunity would be nullified, as essentially all actions and decisions of government 
actors involve the exercise of discretion. See id. 
The same reasoning applied by our courts when interpreting the inspection 
exception and the discretionary function exception applies with equal force to the 
licensing exception. The term "approval," as well as the terms "license" and 
"authorization," have more than one meaning. One definition of the term 
"license" simply is the "permission to act," as quoted in the District's opening brief 
at page 22. Another definition of the term is the "permission granted by 
competent authority to engage in a business or occupation or in an activity 
otherwise unlawful." MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, www.merriam-
webster.com/discretionarv/license (quoted in the District's opening brief at page 
22). One definition of the term "approve" simply is the ratification of any act or 
thing already performed. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 102 (6th ed. 1990). But 
another definition of the term "approve" is to "sanction officially." Id. The fact 
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that these various terms have multiple definitions does not render any of the 
exception provisions in the statute ambiguous. When the entire immunity statute is 
read in full, giving effect to each provision and to the public policy behind the 
exception as stated in Gillman, the meanings of the terms intended by the 
legislature become clear. 
Applying the analysis of previous Utah decisions, the legislature's intention 
that the licensing exception apply to regulatory activity is clear. The legislature 
never intended to grant immunity to public actors for negligent decisions made 
during their ministerial activities on government property. See, e.g., Nelson, 919 
P.2d at 575-76; Ericksen, 858 P.2d at 998; Doe v. Arguelles, 716 P.2d 279, 282-83 
(Utah 1985). Consequently, the discretionary function exception, despite the 
absence of any qualifying language, does not apply to any discretionary act, but 
only to core policy-making decisions. See, e.g., Nelson, 919 P.2d at 575; Morrison 
v. Salt Lake City Corp., 600 P.2d 553, 555 (Utah 1979) (no immunity for 
operational decision approving sale of motorcycle). Similarly, the inspection 
exception, despite the lack of any limiting language, does not apply to inspection 
activities of an operational character, but just to regulatory inspections. See, e.g., 
Johnson, 98 P.3d at 782. Likewise, the licensing exception clearly was not 
intended to apply to operational decisions or activities on the government's own 
premises, but was intended to protect regulatory discretion. See Francis v. State, 
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2010 WL 5857571, P.3d (Utah 2010) (State not immune under 
licensing exception because it does not have regulatory power over Federal land); 
Healthcare Services Group, Inc. v. Department of Health, 40 P.3d 591, 599 (Utah 
2002) (licensing exception inapplicable to operational decision); Ericksen, 858 
P.2d at 998 (policy of both licensing exception and inspection exception is to 
protect regulatory discretion); Gillman, 782 P.2d at 512-13; Morrison, 600 P.2d at 
555; Johnson, 98 P.3d at 781- 82; Watson v. Apache County, 189 P.3d 1085, 1089 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2008); McCormickv. WalMart Stores, Inc., 600 S.E.2d 576, 581 
(W. Va. 2004). To rule otherwise would eviscerate the waivers of immunity found 
in Sections 63G-7-301(3) and (4). 
Nevertheless, the District argues that the Thayers' complaint itself triggers 
application of the licensing exception because the complaint sometimes used the 
word "approved" or "authorized" in describing Goulding's and Richan's response 
to Eaton's plan to fire a live weapon during the school play. But throughout 
Plaintiffs' complaint and other pleadings in this case, those terms have been used 
interchangeably with synonyms such as "consented," "acquiesced," "agreed," and 
"allowed." It is unreasonable to suggest that the legislature intended that the 
licensing exception would be so loose as to include ministerial actions that can be 
described with terms such as "consent" and "agreed," without any connection to 
any discretionary or regulatory function. Indeed, the term "issuance" of "licenses, 
l i 
permits, approvals . . . and similar authorizations/' coupled with the waivers of 
immunity, indicates that the licensing exception is meant to apply to regulatory 
acts. See Francis, 2010 WL 5857571 at fflf 16-17; Ericksen, 858 P.2d at 998; 
Watson, 189 P.3d at 1089 (licensing exception contemplates official acts); 
McCormick, 600 S.E.2d at 581 (licensing exception pertains to regulatory acts). 
Here, Eaton's decision to use a handgun for a sound effect in his play was 
not a regulatory function. Nor was it the exercise of any discretion that is essential 
to the exercise of government. Eaton and Goulding made the ministerial decision 
to bring a dangerous weapon on to school property for no more reason than to 
provide a sound effect in their play, and then they negligently failed to supervise 
the gun's use or to protect the students from the danger that they brought to the 
school. That conduct did not constitute the "issuance" of anything remotely 
similar to a license, permit, or similar approval or authorization. Under Gillman, 
Ericksen, Johnson, Francis, Healthcare Services, Nelson, and Morrison, there is 
no immunity for such operational negligence. 
B. The District erroneously argues that Goulding's "approval" of the 
handgun in the school play was an immune, discretionary decision 
to vary from the District's "Safe Schools Policy." 
The District makes extensive argument in a long footnote in its opening brief 
that Goulding was exercising protected discretion when he consented to Eaton's 
use of the gun in the school play. The argument has no merit. The Utah courts 
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have ruled time and again that immune discretionary decisions are those that 
involve core policy making discretion. See, e.g., Nelson, 919 P.2d at 575-76. 
Goulding was not engaged in any policy making activity when he permitted Eaton 
to use a gun in the school play. The District leadership, not Goulding, sets the 
policies for the District. There is no immunity for ministerial decisions, such as 
Goulding's decision, which involve the implementation of policy, not the making 
of policy. See id. 
Furthermore, the District incorrectly alleges that Goulding exercised 
discretion to make an exception to the District's "Safe Schools Policy." The Safe 
Schools Policy only addresses a student's possession of a weapon or look-alike 
weapon on campus. See Safe Schools Policy, attached to the District's opening 
brief at Addendum C. The Safe Schools Policy does not address the topic of guns 
at schools possessed by faculty or adults. The Safe Schools Policy has no 
connection to Goulding's decision to allow Eaton to bring a gun to the school 
because Goulding's decision did not involve the use or possession of the gun by a 
student. Goulding and Eaton simply were negligent in bringing a gun onto the 
school campus and then in failing to provide training or supervision to keep the 
gun away from the students. There is no immunity for such ministerial 
negligence. See, e.g., Nelson, 919 P.2d at 575-76. 
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In arguing for immunity despite Goulding's and Eaton's affirmative actions 
putting Tucker Thayer in grave danger, the District attempts to disavow its non-
delegable duty to keep its students safe when on school grounds. School teachers 
and officials stand in loco parentis to the students and are under a duty to 
reasonably keep the students safe while on school grounds. See State v. Largo, 473 
P.2d 895, 897 (Utah 1970). It defies reason and public policy for the District to 
argue that its employees are allowed to recklessly put their students in harm's way 
in dereliction of their duty to protect the students, but then claim immunity for their 
own affirmative dereliction of duty. 
In that regard, this case is similar to Little v. Department of Family Services, 
667 P.2d 49 (Utah 1983). There, the Department of Family Services ("DFS"), 
under a duty to protect the safety and well-being of a minor child placed in foster 
care, negligently caused the death of the child by failing to properly supervise her 
foster home placement. Id. at 51. DFS argued for immunity on the ground that the 
claim arose out of DFS's discretionary decision to place the child in a foster home. 
Id. This court reasoned that, even assuming the decision to place the child in foster 
care was a discretionary one: 
Once that decision was made and the placement occurred, the question 
was no longer whether the child was to receive foster care, but whether 
due care was exercised under a duty assumed. Where a breach of that 
duty can be shown, the government is held to the same standard as 
private individuals and cannot cloak itself with the mantle of discretion. 
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Id. The Little court therefore held that: 
The failure of Family Services to properly evaluate the foster home, its 
failure to supervise Jennifer's placement and its failure to protect her 
from harm was a breach of conduct implemental in nature and is 
properly held actionable when it was found to be negligent. 
Id. at 52. 
The holding of Little applies here. Unlike DFS in Little, the District 
here has no colorable argument that Goulding and Eaton's decision to bring a 
gun onto the school premises simply for use as a sound effect in a school play 
was a protected, discretionary activity. See, e.g., Nelson, 919 P.2d at 575-76. 
However, like DFS in Little, Goulding and Eaton in this case stood in loco 
parentis to Tucker Thayer, and owed him a duty to take reasonable 
precautions, and act appropriately, to protect his safety. See Little, 667 P.2d 
at 51; Largo, 473 P.2d at 897. Goulding and Eaton cannot circumvent that 
direct responsibility under the cloak of immunity. There simply is no 
immunity for a school's negligent conduct in failing to reasonably supervise 
its students or protect them from deadly harm. See Little, 667 P.2d at 51; see 
also Nelson, 919 P.2d at 575-76 (where government takes on a duty to 
specific persons, there is no immunity for breach of that duty). 
At times, apparently to give the appearance of a discretionary function, 
the District mischaracterizes the Thayers' complaint by suggesting that the 
15 
sequence of events began when the gun owner (Mr. Amodt) went to Goulding 
with a request to bring a gun to the school.] The complaint makes no such 
claim. The complaint clearly states that: (a) Eaton wanted to use a gun in the 
school play; (b) he arranged to use a gun owned by the Amodts; (c) he 
consulted with SRO Richan, who stated that the gun must be handled by an 
adult; and (d) Richan discussed his conditions with Goulding, who gave his 
assent. See Complaint at fflf 19-22, 30-32, attached to Plaintiffs' Opening 
Brief as Addendum No. 2. 
Furthermore, assuming for the purpose of argument that Goulding 
exercised "discretion" in allowing the gun on campus, such decision did not 
obviate his and Eaton's separate duty to supervise and protect Tucker Thayer. 
See Little, 667 P.2d at 51. Goulding never gave permission for Tucker 
Thayer to use a gun. To do so would have been criminal. There is no logic to 
the District's argument that, because Goulding and Eaton introduced a gun 
onto the campus, they were relieved of any responsibility for the students' 
safety. Public policy screams the opposite. Eaton and Goulding should have 
been under a heightened duty to protect the students once they brought a 
deadly weapon into their midst. Tragically, Goulding and Eaton utterly failed 
1
 This proceeding is based on the District's motion to dismiss the complaint, so 
complaint must be interpreted broadly in the Thayers' favor. 
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in their duty to the students. They are not immune for such negligence. See 
Little, 667 P.2d at 51; see also Nelson, 919 P.2d at 575-76. 
C. The District's opening brief does not cite a single case that 
has interpreted the "issuance" of an "approval" as the 
District proposes. 
The District argues that Utah precedent directly supports the District's 
position. However, the District does not cite a single case where a court ruled 
that the "issuance" of an "approval" applies to an agency's own internal, 
operational conduct. In fact, the District did not even cite a single case 
involving the interpretation or analysis of the meaning of the "issuance" of an 
"approval." 
The District heavily relies on Moss v. Pete Suazo Utah Athletic 
Commission, 175 P.3d 1042 (Utah 2007), but Moss only highlights the 
distinction between regulatory acts and operational acts. In Moss, the Athletic 
Commission's regulatory mandate was at issue. The plaintiff first argued that 
the licensing exception should be interpreted to only apply to the licensing of 
activities that "will pose a high risk to health or safety," but the court found 
no statutory language to support that argument. Id. at 1046. The plaintiff 
then argued that the Commission's authorization of the boxing match was not 
a licensing decision. The court disagreed, holding that the Commission's 
duty to decide whether to permit a boxer to fight in a bout is inseparably 
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connect to, and indistinguishable from, the Commission's licensing duty. Id. 
The Moss court concluded that the "essential element of such a decision 
continues to be whether to retract governmental authorization of private 
activity." Id. at 1047 (emphasis added). 
Moss involved the discretionary, regulatory licensing activities of the 
Athletic Commission. Moss had nothing to do with the "approval" of an 
agency's own operations on its own property. Nowhere did Moss state or 
intimate that the licensing exception applies to ministerial, internal activities 
of an agency. Rather, Moss expressly ruled that the decision of the Athletic 
Commission arose out of its duty to regulate a private activity. Id. Here, 
Eaton and Goulding were not exercising any licensing, permitting, or other 
regulatory authority. Thus, Moss is inapposite to the District's position in this 
case. 
The District also spent time discussing Lovendahl v. Jordan School 
District, 63 P.3d 705 (Utah 2002). However, Lovendahl had nothing to do 
with the licensing exception. Lovendahl, a controversial split decision, 
interpreted the "hazardous waste exception," currently codified as UCA 
Section 63G-7-305(5)(s)(iii). But even there, the Lovendahl court made no 
finding of immunity, but remanded the case back to the district court to 
18 
determine whether a hazardous material was even at issue. Id. at 716. 
Nowhere did the Lovendahl court liken or compare the hazardous waste 
exception to the licensing exception. Thus, Lovendahl does not provide any 
precedential value for the District in this case. 
Moreover, the District erroneously argues that the legislature has not 
altered the statutory language of the hazardous waste exception since 
Lovendahl. See the District's opening brief at page 17 fn. 4. The District 
again fails to recognize that the governmental immunity statute must be read 
as a whole. At the time Lovendahl was decided, UCA Section 63G-30-10 
read in part: [ijmmunity from suit of all government entities is waived . . . 
except that if the injury arises out of. . . ." (Emphasis added.) But the 
legislature thereafter replaced the word "all" with the word "each." Section 
63G-7-301(5) now reads in part that [i]mmunity from suit of each 
government entity is not waived . . . if the injury arises out of . . . ." 
(Emphasis added). 
The legislature's replacement of the word "all" with "each" should not 
be dismissed as irrelevant or unintentional. The change suggests that the 
legislature recognized that, because differing agencies have differing 
functions, not all exceptions to immunity will apply to all government 
19 
entities. A reasonable interpretation of the language change is that the legisla-
ture intended that the courts analyze each government entity's activities in 
each case. In this case, Goulding's and Eaton's operational decision to use a 
gun as a sound effect in their school play is at issue, as is their duty to protect 
their students during a school function. The Utah courts have applied the 
licensing exception in some cases involving regulatory activity, but our courts 
never have applied the licensing exception to operational conduct such as 
here. See Francis, 2010 WL 5857571 at ffif 16-17; Healthcare Services, 40 
P.3d at 599; Ericksen, 850 P.2d at 998. 
CONCLUSION 
Utah precedent establishes that the District is liable to the Thayers for 
Goulding's and Eaton's breach of their duty to supervise and protect Tucker 
Thayer. Utah cases such as Francis, Moss, Healthcare Services, Ericksen, 
Gillman, Johnson, Nelson, and Morrison establish that the licensing 
exception, inspection exception, and discretionary function exception pertain 
to regulatory and core discretionary conduct, not to operational or ministerial 
conduct. Cases in other states have ruled consistently with Gillman and 
Ericksen, holding that similar licensing exceptions apply to regulatory 
activities. Furthermore, Little established that there is no immunity for a 
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government actor's breach of an affirmative and direct duty owed to a 
specific individual or class of individuals. Because Goulding's and Eaton's 
actions in this case were not regulatory or discretionary functions, and 
because they were under a direct duty to supervise and protect Tucker Thayer, 
their breach of their duty to Tucker Thayer is actionable. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1 day of April, 2011. 
GALLIAN, WILCOX, 
WELKER, OLSON, & BECKSTROM, L.C. 
ael L Welker 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
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